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In August 1975, thirty-five nations of Eastern and Western Eu-
rope, in addition to the United States and Canada, met in Helsinki and
signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). The ultimate goal of the Conference was to further
the loosely defined goals of detente.1 Among the most important ele-
ments of the Final Act were the human rights provisions of Principle
Seven, the so-called Basket I provisions, which dealt with security and
disarmament in Europe, and Basket III, which focused on human
rights and provided for freer movement of people, ideas, and informa-
tion in all of the signatory nations.2 The Principles enumerated in Arti-
cles 1-7 and in the Basket III provisos were difficult to negotiate. They
sprang from the Western conviction that genuine security and coopera-
tion in Europe would be impossible if human rights were not honored
and if rigid barriers in the East to travel, culture, business, science, reli-
gion, general information and family reunification were not lowered.3
The earliest opportunity to assess progress in implementing the Fi-
nal Act was the initial CSCE conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in
1. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, COMM. ON INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS, H.R. REP. 95th Cong., 1st Sess., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: FINDINGS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS TWO YEARS AFTER HELSINKI (Comm. Print 1977).
2. Basket III- Implementation of the Heisinki4ccords Hearings on Implementation of
the Helsinki Accords Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, Vol. 1 (1977) (statement of Leonard Garment).
3. 77 Dep't State Bull. 829 (1969). Basket II provisions of the Final Act dealt with
East-West cooperation in the commercial and scientific fields. The West was also quite in-
terested in strengthening the various confidence-building measures of Basket 1, such as prior
notification of major military movements and maneuvers.
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October 1977. President Carter appointed the senior author of this arti-
cle Ambassador-at-Large and head of the United States Delegation.
An immediate controversy developed at Belgrade. The Soviet bloc
countries were singularly unenthusiastic about breathing life into Prin-
ciple VII and the Basket III human rights provisions of the Final Act.
The East was also quite timid with regard to Basket I confidence-build-
ing measures. The Soviets, as they had for many years, argued vocifer-
ously that Principle VI, a nonintervention provision of the Final Act,
precludes CSCE signatories from inquiring into human rights activities
within any other signatory's boundaries.4 But how valid is this Soviet
claim that human rights are a strictly internal matter? Is the Soviet
Union's position consistent with the letter and spirit of the Final Act
and with the evolving doctrine of human rights in international law
and politics?
To support their claim that human rights within a country's bor-
ders are not a matter of international concern, Eastern Bloc nations
appeal to a traditional tenet of international law: that civil and human
rights issues are strictly within the domestic jurisdiction of nations, ex-
cept where the rights of other nations are affected.' The flaws of this
position, however, have been demonstrated all too clearly in the twenti-
eth century. Governments have been the main abusers of the human
rights of their own citizens, and the tenet leaves no realistic remedy for
a citizen whose own government has restricted those rights. Fortu-
nately, a more enlightened transnational perspective in human rights
has emerged in recent decades.6
Aside from the logic of this broad transnational perspective, a
strong case for invalidating the narrow Soviet interpretation of the Fi-
nal Act can be made based on textual analysis. Principle VI (Non-
Intervention in Internal Affairs) of the Final Act specifies that "partici-
pating states will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, indi-
vidual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of another participating state."7 Subsequent
paragraphs of Principle VI, however, qualify and define "intervention,"
making it clear that the prohibited "intervention" is limited to "armed
intervention or threat of such intervention" and "terrorist" or "subver-
4. A. H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 303-
04 (1968).
5. R. C. HINGORANI, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 237 (1979).
6. Id. at 238.
7. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: FinalAct, 4ugust , 1975, 14
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292-1325 (1975).
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sive" or "other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the
regime of another participating state."' Nowhere in the text of Princi-
ple VI is there a direct or indirect prohibition of inquiry by participat-
ing states into human fights violations which occur in other signatory
nations. In fact, every time the Soviets at Belgrade criticized human
rights problems in the West, they implicitly acknowledged the validity
of the Western position that any CSCE signatory can concern itself
with the rights violations within other signatories' borders. Further-
more, any fair reading of the preamble and the text of Principle VII
(respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms), and of Basket
III of the Final Act makes it clear that participating states must concern
themselves with the protection of human rights in all signatory nations
if the goals of Principle VII and Basket III are to be fulfilled. It would
be wholly inconsistent for signatory nations to pledge to cooperate in
humanitarian areas, to increase cultural and educational exchanges, to
facilitate freer movement and contacts among persons and organiza-
tions, and to expand the dissemination of information across national
boundaries if, at the same time, these signatories were prohibited from
either collecting information about Basket III violations outside their
own countries or utilizing Final Act mechanisms to curb such viola-
tions. To proclaim, as do the Soviets, that Final Act signatories have
no right to inquire into Basket I and Basket III violations which occur
in other signatories' territory is to assert that, for all practical purposes,
Basket I and Basket III are null and void. Surely such a perverse con-
struction of the document will not stand, particularly in light of the
provision of Principal VII which states that "the participating states
recognize the universal signfcance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms" (emphasis added) and that these states "will endeavor
jointly and separately, including in cooperation with the United Na-
tions, to promote universal and effective respect for them." 9 If, as Prin-
cipal VII asserts, measures to remedy human rights violations are not
left exclusively to each signatory, measures such as the review of viola-
tions by other signatories and demands for rectification of the viola-
tions surely cannot be challenged.
The Western case for continuing public concern with human rights
violations, however, does not lie exclusively in a textual analysis of the
Final Act but rests also on the specific commitments to human rights
articulated in other international documents signed by Soviet bloc na-
8. Id. at 1294.
9. Id. Principle VIL Principle VII refers to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights and thereby incorporates the Universal Declaration into the Final Act by reference.
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tions. For example, Eastern bloc states have signed the United Nations
Charter, wherein concern for human rights is noted in no less than five
places,' 0 and the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights."I The large number of signatories attests to a worldwide con-
cern with human rights, a concern embodied in the very fabric of the
major international organizations. It transcends national boundaries
and looks to law and to the conscience of humanity for resolution of
rights violations. 2 The distinguished Russian physicist and human
rights activist Andrei Sakharov emphasizes this concern in his assertion
that "since the protection of human rights has been proclaimed in the
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, there can be no reason
to call this issue a matter of purely domestic concern."' 13
The Western position on human rights, while building upon basic
United Nations documents, has also found growing support in the ac-
tivities of Helsinki Accord monitoring groups in the East and the West,
in international law, and in the actions of newly-emerging transna-
tional organizations' 4 such as the International Commission of Jurists,
the Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights, the International League
for Human Rights, the Ligue Belge des Droits de l'Homme, and Am-
nesty International. 5 The Council of Europe has adopted a Conven-
tion on Human Rights for democratic member states in Western
Europe, which grants limited enforcement powers to the European
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights.'6 The Organization of American States, as of 1978, has imple-
mented a human rights treaty under the general authority of an inter-
American Human Rights Court.' 7 Finally, the International Court of
Justice, although it does not yet possess formal jurisdiction over civil
and human rights, has heard at least six cases in which human rights
10. E. DEUTSCH, AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 232 (1977), and U.N. CHARTER
PREAMBLE; art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para. 1(b); art. 55, para. C; and art. 76, para. C.
11. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 16) 21 U.N. Doc, A/0038 (1966); M1u/d/
lateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary General Performs Depository Function, List
of Signatures, Ratfications, Accessions, etc. as at 31 Decembe 1978; ST/LEG/SERD/12
(1979).
12. See J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Ch. 2 (1970).
13. A. SAKHAROV, ALARM AND HOPE 17 (1978).
14. J. KUNZ, THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS 138 (1968); R.C. HINOORANI, supra
note 5, at 238.
15. A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 292.
16. See F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1975); F.
CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1974); COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (8th ed. 1972).
17. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States,
Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights, L/V/I 1.23 doc. 21 rev. 5 (1977),
[Vol. 3
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were a major issue.18
In addition to the legal community, the intellectual community has
been stirred to a higher level of awareness of human rights. The harsh
revelations of Solzhenitsyn's Cruag Archipelago, have with there liter-
ary and moral force, effectively focused the attention of the political left
in Europe and in the United States on the systematic suppression of
basic freedoms in the Soviet Union. This attention has fostered a sur-
prising degree of unity of opinion in the West concerning the preserva-
tion and enhancement of human rights; this unity will be further
strengthened by the October 1979 convictions of six Czech citizens who
were members of the Charter 77 human rights organization, a group
formed to monitor Czechoslovakian government compliance with the
Final Act. The Czech government tried the human rights activists
under conditions of tight security, and banned all Western reporters.
The conviction was widely and justifiably criticized in the West, draw-
ing fire even from the French and Italian Communist parties.' 9
A common thread running through the progress toward the recog-
nition of human rights as a central issue in international relations is the
understanding that nations can bind themselves together and increase
international cooperation not only by emphasizing their common tech-
nical, economic and materialistic interests, but also by recognizing in-
tellectual, spiritual and humanitarian values. If long term international
18. Asylum Case, Columbian-Peruvian [1950] LC.J.R. 266. Haya de la Torre Case (Co-
lumbian-Peruvian) [1951] LC.J.R. 71. The human rights issue in these two related cases on
political asylum was based on an interpretation by the International Court of three Latin
American Extradition and asylum conventions. Cases Concerning the Application of the
Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden) [1958]
LC.J.R. 55. The human rights issue in this case was based on the 1902 Hague Convention
governing the Guardianship of Infants. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania [1950] LCJ.R. 221. The human rights issue in this case was based
on United Nations Resolution 272 III April 30, 1949, which accused Hungary, Bulgaria and
Romania of suppressing human rights in violation of Article 55 of the United Nations char-
ter and in violation of World War II peace treaties with the United States and the United
Kingdom. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide [1951] LCJ.R. 15. The human rights issue in this case was raised when the
General Assembly of the United Nations asked the International Court of Justice for an
advisory opinion on the legitimacy of certain reservations to the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The sixth and most recent case is Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States of
America v. Iran) [1979] I.C.J.R.
The action of the International Court in these six cases indicates that human rights
issues are so intermeshed in existing international law that, even without specific jurisdic-
tion, the Court will inevitably continue to decide cases with important human rights compo-
nents.
19. New York Times, Oct. 24, 1979, at 1, 10; Oct. 25, 1979, at 3; and Oct. 28, 1979, at 9.
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stability is to be achieved, these values must be respected by all nations.
As Andrei Sakharov noted in his Nobel Prize Address, "I am con-
vinced that international trust, mutual understanding, disarmament
and international security are inconceivable without an open society
with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to pub-
lish, and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes
to live."20
To summarize, the Western case for assertiveness on human rights
issues is strongly rooted in international agreements, including the Hel-
sinki Final Act, which reach out with great specificity to cover a wide
range of civil, cultural and social rights. It also has a solid basis in
international law, in regional attention to human rights,2' and in an
evolving transnational awareness that human rights are central to a civ-
ilized, creative society. But beyond dismissing the Soviet legal and po-
litical arguments to ignore human rights violations occurring outside a
country's boundaries, what can the Western nations do?
The United States' agenda for human rights issues as we prepare
for the next CSCE Conference at Madrid in 1980 should not be prima-
rily to amend or improve the Final Act but to insist upon better imple-
mentation by the East of the workable ideals embodied in that
document.22 The United States should also insist on a full accounting
by all signatory states of their implementation record. The basic need
at this juncture is not to expand obligations under the Final Act but to
observe them. Through both quiet and demonstrative diplomacy we
should encourage our Western allies, non-aligned nations, religious
and business leaders, and friends of civil rights to speak more asser-
tively on such matters and to press for more thorough implementation
by the East. The United States should likewise seek to foster freedom
of the press so that citizens, wherever they live, will become aware of
the fundamental freedoms that their governments have pledged to up-
20. SAKHAROV, supra note 13, at 5.
21. See THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16, which is en-
forced by the European Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human
Rights and Jacob, supra note 1, at 3-9. MAX SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 503-07 (1978). See THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGITS,
supra note 17, at Appendix VIII and 74. The Inter-American Human Rights Court serves a
similar function in enforcing the Inter-American Human Rights Treaty which went into
effect in July 1978.
22. The existing language of the Final Act is sound. If amendments are needed, they
can come gradually after we have more years of experience with the Act. The United States
Constitution, after all, has only been amended substantively three times since 1791, with the




Media coverage of the Madrid Conference would increase this
awareness. In retrospect, the West erred at Helsinki to agree to the
proposal by the East to exclude the media from all but the ceremonial
functions of the Belgrade Conference. The result of this exclusion was
that there was much misinformation about what actually occurred at
the first CSCE follow-up meeting. Many in the media ignored two
genuine accomplishments at Belgrade: (1) that delegates from thirty-
five nations convened to review and did review implementation of the
Final Act and by their presence reaffirmed it, and (2) that the signato-
ries of the Final Act agreed to continue their work at Madrid in 1980.
Coverage of the Madrid Conference should be based on facts, not on
leaks. If the United Nations can function successfully with free media
coverage, CSCE Conferences should do the same.
When the CSCE delegates convene in Madrid, the West must not
be timorous in identifying, in specific terms, both the violations of the
rights of individuals and groups and the governments which commit
these violations. As the United States representative to the Belgrade
Conference, the senior author attempted to set an example by acknowl-
edging the human rights problems in his own country as well as criti-
cizing the much greater violations in the East.24 There is no reason
why Soviet and Eastern European delegates should not be called upon
to exercise similar candor concerning parallel problems within their
own borders. Realistically this will not happen, but the demand itself is
of great importance.
In addition to the items on the official agenda at Madrid, the West
should encourage the development of impartial domestic and interna-
tional bodies, such as the CSCE Commission and the Helsinki Watch
Committee in the United States and elsewhere which would investigate
and publicize rights violations. Support for these tribunals, and their
use of such devices as international writs of habeas corpus,' would be
a step toward greater protection of human rights.
Our concern with human rights need not, be directly linked to
other issues under negotiation between East and West, such as trade
and arms control. Human rights is an issue of sufficient importance to
stand on its own and to demand the attention of the international, le-
23. See CAREY, supra note 12, at Ch. 13; A.H. Robertson, supra note 4, at 389-92.
24. The Belgrade CSCE meeting, Review of Implementation and Amendments of New
Proposals: Preliminary Report, U.S. Delegation Statement, Oct. 6 to Dec. 22, 1977 (unpub-
lished United States State Department brochure) at 18.
25. See CAREY, supra note 12, at Chs. 5, 7.
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gal, religious, political and media elites, and the public at large. People
of good will in the East and the West recognize that detente and im-
provement in individual rights must go hand in hand.
To conclude, if there is to be genuine d6tente, it must have a
human face. No era and no region of the world is immune from the
risk of plunging into a dark age of totalitarianism and cruelty. We can
preserve and expand our hard won civil liberties only by taking them
seriously, by recognizing their foundation in recent history and law,
and by working vigorously and creatively to share these liberties with
people everywhere.
